Meillassoux on Metaphysics and Facticity
Meillassoux contends that everything is contingent. While this leads him to relinquish the idea of the absoluteness of God as the ens necessarium, he abandons neither the thought of the Absolute nor of God as such. He rather posits that contingency itself, what he calls Hyper-Chaos or Time, is absolute being. He does not, therefore, reject the idea of an ens realissimum, but such a being would only be a fact, unsurpassable in ultimacy but not necessarily existent. Everything is contingent, says Meillassoux, and so everything is a fact.
Meillassoux's After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency contributes to the Continental project of the overcoming of metaphysics. He does not simply follow what he takes to be the customary distinction whereby metaphysics is a thinking of presence that seeks a foundati example, contends that metaphysics becomes manifest in the god of ontotheology, the ens necessarium. This demarcation of metaphysics, as Heraclitus, Nietzsche or Deleuze, who posit a necessary structure of becoming, to escape. For them everything repeats according to the necessities of will to power or repetition respectively.
x does not believe it surpasses metaphysics because the correlation itself is thought as necessary. It is necessary that the correlation subsists in order for it to be possible that there be beings rather than nothing. Admittedly, if there should be something rather than nothing, then the correlation is necessary, but that treats the correlation as a conditional necessity. Meillassoux, however, as a "speculative mateCorrelationism…is not anti-realism but anti-absolutism. Correlationism is the modern way of rejecting all possible knowledge of 1 -time_without_ becoming.pdf]. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as TB. 2 Quentin Meillassoux, "The Immanence of the World Beyond," The Grandeur of Reason Symposium, no. (Spring/Printemps ) an absolute…. There are two main forms of the absolute; the realist one, which is that of a non-thinking reality independent of our access to it, and the idealist one, which consists on the contrary in the absolutization of the correlation itself
He certainly breaks with the tradition of absolutism as a search for the ens necessarium ation of an ens realissimum considered not as a conditional necessity but as factical. 3 The question is whether one can absolutize the correlation without grounding the correlation itself upon the necessity of subjective reality. In other words, perhaps the correlation can be thought realistically rather than idealistically if it is thought as a fact that could have not been but factically is, a contingent fact.
What precludes one from absolutizing the correlation by thinking das Urzufällige]" or "original contingency [der Urzufall]" 4 as Schelling deems it? This would not be an idealist absolutization of the correlation, which still treats it as a conditional necessity, but an absolutization of contingency, the contingency of the correlation itself. This would posit the correlation as a fact rather than as a ground or condition. It is not then thought as a conditional necessity, but it is considered in advance of that for which it could only subsequently, i.e., in a belated sense, be retroactively posited as necessary. For itself it is a fact and not a condition. Meillassoux too writes, "I call 'facticity' the absence of reason for any reality." "We can only attain conditional necessity, never absolute necessity." (TB, , then, seemingly does not banish necessity tout court, admitting the possibility of conditional or factical necessity, i.e., subsequent rather than prior necessity. He precludes only a priori necessity, i.e., absolute necessity. While it may be true that the correlation must be if there is to be something rather than nothing, this imputes only conditional necessity to the correlation. The correlation itself, however, as anterior to the being of the world, is not necessary. One can speak of it as a necessary condition only subsequently, i.e., post factum. This essay attempts to think the correlation in-itself, i.e., as an absolute, and not relatively as the pre-condition of what follows from it. If one absolutizes the correlation by confronting its lack of reason, i.e., its facticity and contingency, one eclipses metaphysics, i.e.
Meillassoux on Contingency
The principle of reason or reason itself possesses only conditional or posterior necessity. Prior to the subsequent necessity of reason, one llassoux controversially hypothesizes, "The irrationality of things thus discloses to us being qua being, and this being of all things consists in a chaos subordinate to no reason whatsoever." 5 Unreason is primal chaos, nothing but pre-rational and accidental facticity. According to Meillassoux, however, the contingency of chaos is itself necessary. He writes, "Contingency, and only contingency, is absolutely necessary; facticity and only facticity, is not factual, but eter--contingent, i.e., necessary, may be. Apparently, it is not a fact after all, but it is necessary that there is no necessity. Meillassoux formulates the necessity of facticity under the rhetoric of the "factial." "Factiality is not facticity, but the necessity of facticity, the essence of facticity." (T Meillassoux now suggests that the correlation of thinking and being is not only not necessary, but, given factiality, it cannot be so, yet this would not be a fact. The issue concerns his thesis that "to be is to be factual -and this is not a fact." reason factical or factial?
Meillassoux terms the principle of contingency "hyper-chaos." "Hyper-Chaos: its contingency is so radical that even becoming, disorder, or randomness can be destroyed by it, and replaced by the foregoing, it seems that Meillassoux's contingency-HyperChaos-does not, in fact, render its opposite impossible, namely, the subsequent accrual of reason, the haven of necessity facticity is the absolute, contingency no longer means the necessity of destruction or disorder, but rather the equal contingency of order and disorder…", something only describable as "surcontingence, supercontingency." (TB, -Chaos seemingly does not preclude order, reason and necessity after all. Why, then, does he erect the notion of factiality, i.e., the necessity of contingency, if HyperChaos does not preclude the necessity of reason? the "may-be [peut-être forgetting of tenses quite striking. Certainly, the boy who is presently sick is the same boy that in the future can become healthy. Noncontradiction, contra Meillassoux, only precludes that something cannot "already be" its opposite, but this does not exclude that it "may-be" its opposite. Meillassoux's peut-être translates literally as the "perhaps," a contingency that does not even preclude that necessity may-be. A contradictory being cannot be-which he understands to imply that contingency, therefore, must be-but how does it follow from his premises that the opposite of contingency cannot come to be, i.e., that it perhaps may-be or can-be?
For Meillassoux, whatever Chaos has not yet precluded is not yet possible as an actual potency, but it is only that which has not yet been excluded, i.e., rendered im-potent or im-possible. All that is excluded is that Chaos would already be in contradiction, i.e., already positively contain two contradictory potencies. In Chaos nothing is factically excluded and, therefore, nor has anything yet been deterpossibility prior to potency, a dense possibility or the "virtual." 6 The 6 Virtuality," Collapse II Beyond," just quoted in the body of the text, encapsulates his "Spectral Dilemma," Collapse IV not of a god that "does not yet exist" but of one "no longer existing." "Immanence of the World Beyond," on the other hand, is not much better, translating God's "inexistence" as "non-existence," apparently unaware of the heritage of this as a technical term inherited from Alain Badiou. The inexistent is a latent, i.e., not yet potent, possibility that still lies dormant in a situation.
virtual knows only dense-possibles-the virginal future of the maybe-but not real potentialities.
Time, Meillassoux proclaims, renders all laws contingent. He contends:
I accord to time the capacity to bring forth new laws which were possibles…which were not at all contained in precedent situations…. We must then understand that it follows that such cases irrupt, properly speaking, from nothing, since no structure contains them as eternal potentialities before their emergence. 7
Hyper-Chaos does not contain a determinate set of potentialities that would unfold according to the necessary structure of time. It is not even necessary that time bring forth any set of potentialities from its virtual state. If time does bring forth novel possibilities, then such is completely contingent. It is not necessary that there be something instead of nothing. Time itself is not the unfolding of any other prior substratum of reality, even Chaos, nor does it constitute a substratum itself, lest one lapse into the necessity of metaphysics and time as its ens necessarium. To posit time as the unfolding of Chaos would be to posit Chaos as a substrate and time as the necessary law of its presencing.
Schelling's Ontology of the Unprethinkable Advent
The contention of the latter half of this essay is that the late Schelling's speculatively empirical method culminates in an "ontology of the fact" or a "factical ontology." The difference between Schelling's principle of non-contradiction-or the Law of the World as a prescriptive law of being-and Meillassoux's account of noncontradiction is that while both view the virtual, the "may-be" or the can-be (das Seinkönnende), as not excluding anything possible, Schelling suggests that exclusion/decisiveness must occur, even if it decides for nothingness. God, the being whose essence or modus operandi would be necessary, may or may not exist, but if a being with a necessary mode of operation would be existent, then it could neither have passed into being nor ever pass out of being, but it must be excluded or not. He concludes, "For this reason nothing more is said, however, than that God, if he is, can only necessarily and not contingently be." 11 At any rate, the permanence and even eternity of the necessity that would be God's essence is a virtuality that God's reasonless existence (Hyper-Chaos) surely cannot exclude! What comes to be cannot in the same instant pass out of being. That, however, is precisely the description of the happening of Chaos. The question as to why there is something rather than nothing is the same as to why there is meaning rather than chaos, permanence rather than impermanence, regularity rather than irregularity. Given that there is something rather than nothing, so constancy and rule must have come to be. Yet, there is no law that says something must be constant and orderly. There is no law that might ground the uniformity/necessity of nature. There is no explanation for this fact, because it is just that, a contingent fact. That uniformity came into being out of non-uniformity indicates that being stands still for thought. There is a correlation between being and thinking, but this correlation is only a fact to be narrated, not This fact is im-possible or unthinkable prior to its advent, its comingto-be. As Schelling phrases it, "Nothing further is said of the event itself than just that it has happened, that it has bechanced; it is, so to speak, the primal deed itself (the beginning of history), the factumthe happening par excellence." 12 This is the primordial accident, an anarchic deed without ground or reason, primordial contingency [das Urzufällige].
Schelling on Chaos and the Law of the World
Schelling does not ground the facticity of the world upon reason.
It is a necessary question: Why is there sense at all, why is there not nonsense instead of sense?... The whole world lies as it were entangled in reason, but the question is: How has it come into this net, 'because there is manifestly still something other and something more than mere reason in the world, even something that strives beyond these borders.' 13 The world is without a prior reason. "[The world] contains a preponderant mass of unreason, so that one could just as well say that the rational is only the accidental." 14 There is not something rather than Schelling expands, "The question is whether one can say that philosophy has actually comprehended a fact when one explains that it is 12 17 What proceeds from chaos is not something whose possibility could be seen in advance but "unprethinkable [unvordenklich] ." as such before it has become a Monas, i.e., thinkable as an essence. As unprethinkable, Schelling's Chaos precedes (in a ontological rather than temporal sense) the correlation between thinking and being; it is "the outer-logical fact." 18 It is not yet thinkable, though it may subsequently be supplemented with thinkability, i.e. a necessary essence. It is unprethinkable-and so pre-correlational! 19 -but that does not preclude that it "may-be" post-thinkable. Prior to the correlation with thinkability it simply is nought. Chaos, apart from its ordering (as time) is nothing at all. The real question is about its timing, the event that correlates Da to Was, being and thinkability. Time itself is the unprethinkable event/advent that supplements Hyper-Chaos with its thinkability and identity. 15 One can only say of it that it Is, not that it necessarily Is. In this sense, it is primordial contingency, the primordial accident itself, whereby a large distinction is to be made between the accidental which is through another and that which is accidental through itself, which does not have a cause outside itself and is inferred from the accidental in everything else. 21 Hyper-Chaos has not actually articulated anything at all until it comes to be as the factical correlation between thinking and being. Time itself is the generator of both Hyper-Chaos as chaos and the order/necessity that ensues from it. The identity of Hyper-Chaos itself is only acquired through its supplementation or correlation with essence, order and necessity. Only then is it a ground and a selfsame. One cannot offer any reason why this grounding occurs, beUngrund entails precisely the faltering of the principle of reason. Schelling writes, "…[T]he foundation of all philosophical rationalism, i.e., every system, which raises reason to a principle, is destroyed." 22 The only explanation for this fact is the principle of non-contradiction itself as the Law of the World [das Weltgesetz].
Hyper-Chaos/unprethinkable existence is the absolute indifference of every virtual possibility, a virtual contradiction or coexistence of opposites, which cannot be and therefore must be decided. Hyper-Chaos does not even exclude its opposite: order and necessity. Accordingly, it does not yet even have the identity of a contradiction proper; for, it both is and is not its opposite. It is nothing, not even a contradiction, decisively and determinately because, since it has not yet excluded anything, it also does not yet contain 20 Only then does it accrue its identity as the necessarily contradictory being that cannot be its opposite, which, as virtual, it still may-be identity in correlation. Beforehand, it is but the facticity of the principle of non-contradiction itself, the Law of the World. Schelling asks and answers, "How can one put forward a law for something that can in no way be? When it is known that a contradiction cannot be, it must be known that it nevertheless in a certain way is." 24 If contradictions cannot be, then they demand to be resolved. The principle of non-contradiction or the Law of the World demands that contradictions cannot be tolerated, that they must be decided and supplemented with identity. Prior to decisive correlation Hyper-Chaos is nothing, indeed not even a contradiction which is necessarily have to be ò u and not its opposite, i.e., also not noncontradiction. As Hyper-Chaos it is neither contradiction nor noncontradiction, but the undecidability between these two! The law of non-contradiction as a demand that contradictions be resolved or that everything acquire a decided identity is thus not descriptive, saying nothing of what is, but a prescriptive law of being. The law of non-contradiction as the prescriptive Law of the World demands that a correlation between thinking and being ought to advene or not, but one or the other. Nothing could always have held sway instead of something. Hyper-Chaos could have secured its identity by deciding against being/identity and for nothingness/ambivalence. The Law of the World demands that whatever is or is nought, be or not be decisively and determinately. Though tolerable of nothingness, it "tolerates nothing accidental." 25 Supercontingency could have persisted, but only as long as it persisted by positively excluding non-contingency, determinacy and necessity. Contrary to Meillassoux, who suggests that Hyper-Chaos can bring about anything except what is necessary, Schelling asserts that it cannot even bring about itself as something which is instead of is nought until it stands in opposition to, i.e., in correlation with, something self-identical, something necessarily itself, something which cannot be its opposite. This does not mean that it is necessary that there be something, even the correlation itself, rather than nothing, but, to be precise, it means that the dense-possibility of the correlation must arrive. 26 This possibility must be decided for or against. Chaos must either be or not-be, but it cannot ambivalently and indecisively straddle the fence between being and non-being.
God as the Ens Necessarium?
For Schelling, God would not be a necessary existent but the necessary essence which supercontingency has contracted for itself. God's mode of being (modus operandi) or essence is necessary even if God's existence is only factical and contingent. God is an original and eternal facticity. There is no reason to think that the eternal must be necessary rather than a fact which could have not been. In any event, one can only proclaim the existence of God as an empirical fact. God is not empirical in the sense of something sensible, a possible object of perception. There is a large difference between sensibilism and empiricism. The assertion that God, in fact, exists is a statement of a 25 "…das nichts Zufälliges duldet…" (Schelling, S mtliche Werke non-sensible or "speculative empiricism," 27 and a possible tenet of "factical ontology." Schelling is a speculative empiricist who does not give up a rationalist side. Meillassoux too writes that "…because the metaphysical principle of reason is absolutely false, the logical principle of non-28 Schelling practices "empirical a priorism," 29 a method that is neither a priori nor a posteriori, but one that functions per posterius. Speculative empiricism excludes nothing experiential, a domain inclusive of much that is supersensible, e.g., the will of a person, which is only known through one's empirical consequents, namely, one's words and deeds. A person is un-pre-thinkable and so, if thinkable at all, only post-thinkable, thinkable through their posterius. A person is known neither a priori nor a posteriori, neither through reason alone nor through the sensible qua sensible, but the supersensible person is known per posterius, through their posterior words and deeds. In like manner, one could only proclaim the existence of God as a contingent, yet primordial and eternal, facticity per posterius. On the one hand, the assertion is a priori insofar as one does not seek a ground or condition for the posterior-the words and deeds, or God's history-but one seeks and speculates about the meaning of the prius. On the other hand, the assertion is a posteriori insofar as it is a speculatively empirical claim. One does not seek the meaning of the posterius though, but the meaning of the prius; one only argues through the posterius. 30 Schel 27 This term is to be used as both an allusion and counterfoil to the speculative materialism of Meillassoux and others. 28 Nathan Brown, a commentator of Meillassoux, has argued, "If many of us have found Meillassoux's volume invigorating, that is because it opens the promise of a new relation between rationalism and empiricism…" See "The Speculative and
The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism this new relation. 29 "empirisher Apriorismus." F. W. J. Schelling, "Einleitung in die Philosophie der S mtliche Werke (ed.) 30 Be it the person, God or the facticity of reason itself, the most appropriate method operates per posterius. Schelling is a speculative empiricist that does not relinquish the rationalist side, because reason and the necessity of reason are terior and contingent facticity itself. Reason is not selfreason. One must ask: Why is there reason rather than unreason? One must speculate beyond reason, a facticity which just as easily could have not been.
The absolute prius should not be proved (this is beyond all proof, it is the absolute beginning, which is certain through itself); it itself (the absolute prius) should not be proved, but the consequent of this, this must be factically proved and, thereby, the divinity [Gottheit] of that prius -that it is God and thus that God exists. 31 The point is not to prove the existence of Hyper-Chaos and its contingency but rather the necessary essence, the divinity, of primordial contingency. One does not begin with God as the ens necessarium, but that does not preclude that one might end there. That the absolute prius, Hyper-Chaos, may-be Godly, that it may exist with a necessary and uniform modus operandi, is not to be excluded. That it does, in fact, exist in this manner, however, is only to be known post factum; God is only post-thinkable because God's existence is un-prethinkable. The divinity of the prius, that it is in fact God, would reside in the consequent and not in the prius itself; it would reside in the essence and not in the existence of the prius. The prius, arbitrary chance and disorder, is certainly not divine. There is no divine substrate. If there is a God, then he is a God who has eternally advened as the supplementary order or cosmetics of chance and disorder.
Commensurate with this contingent God Schelling offers an openended or running proof. Schelling explicates as follows:
This proof does not at all just go to a determinate point, thus not just to the world for instance, which is the object of our experience, but rather as I myself, concerning human individuals who know that they are but demand perpetual proofs of their existence, so is it also here. 32 God must perpetually prove and reprove himself, i.e., his divine character and not just his existence. He must continue to exist as God or with a Godly modus. He must prove his identity, i.e., his divinity, 31 what already existed in advance as concealed, but it brings something forth, e.g., God's necessary essence, that simply was nought, the manifestation of a dense-possible, an im-possible. Schelling, however, by absolutizing neither the correlation nor reason as such, but the contingency or facticity of the correlation and reason itself, avoids factiality, i.e., the necessity of contingency. He rather espouses the contingency of necessity.
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33 Peter Gratton rightly surmises that in concluding that contingency is necessary Meillassoux also concludes that there is no necessary being. God does not unlike Schelling's, is not an actual contingency, but a possible contingency. God may-be at a future time. In tune with Richard Kearney's similarly possible God, however, Gratton offers this evaluation of the suggestion that God is a necessary being. "If this were the case it would come at the cost of thinking God as unfree." "Meillassoux's Speculative Politics: Time and the Divinity to Come," Analecta Hermeneutica More poignantly, however, he also offers the following condemnation. "It is not clear why this outcome"-that God might possibly come to be in the future-"would come over any other: why not a life born by a Demiurge who resurrects us only to provide us with greater evils?" (ibid.
-possible can be excluded in advance, that also means that there is no sense in arbitrarily speculating about which of these dense-possibles may actually come to be since none are any more probable than any others. Schelling's speculative empiricism, however, does not speculate about possibilities simpliciter, but it begins with the actually given. This protects it from ad hoc speculations of the kind one sees in Meillassoux.
fact, is what he deems the nature of originality, which is " conceive as possible in that it is actual possibility through the actuality. [Originell ist das, was wir als möglich erst begreifen dadurch, dass es wirklich ist; wovon wir also die Möglichkeit erst durch die Wirklichkeit begreifen.]" (Schelling, Grundlegung
